RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRE/PURCHASE LENDING IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA by Schreiner, Mark et al.
Racial Discrimination In Hire/Purchase Lending








Paper submitted for presentation
at the AAEA Annual Meeting
July 27-30, 1997, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Contact author:
 Mark Schreiner
Room 237 Agricultural Administration Building
2120 Fyffe Road
Columbus, OH, 43210-1099
614-292-9329 (office) 614-481-0314 (home)
e-mail: schreiner.10@osu.eduAbstract
A partial-observability model finds evidence of racial discrimination by retailers of consumer
durables in apartheid South Africa. In particular, black households are 13 percentage points more
likely to demand a hire/purchase loan but not to have one supplied than are other households, all
else equal.
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 The cash price is the equivalent of the principal of a loan, and the periodic rental
1
payments are the equivalent of the installment payments of a loan. The periodic effective interest
rate is the periodic discount rate that would make the present value of the inflow of the loan
principal followed by periodic outflows of the loan installments be zero. The annual effective
interest rate is the periodic effective interest rate multiplied by the number of periods in a year.
I. The Scope and Structure of Hire/Purchase Lending
One goal of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is to provide access
to financial markets to all South Africans. After savings deposits, the most common formal
financial product used by black South Africans are hire/purchase agreements between households
and retailers of consumer durables such as televisions or furniture. Hire/purchase loans are also
the most common formal loan used by rural households, poor households, and female-headed
households (Schreiner, Graham, and Coetzee). Therefore, understanding the structure of
hire/purchase lending may inform the RDP’s attempts to extend the frontier of formal lending.
Even though hire/purchase agreements are legally structured as rental agreements, they are
equivalent to conventional installment loans. For example, a borrower may agree to make rental
payments of 120 Rands per month for 12 months for a wardrobe with a cash price of 1,000
Rands. Although there is no explicit interest rate, the implicit effective interest rate is about 73%
per year.  If the borrower misses a payment, then the lender may repossess the wardrobe. Unless a
1
fee is paid, the borrower loses the wardrobe and the accumulated equity implicit in any payments
made before falling into arrears.
On the supply side, there are at least two reasons why lenders are willing to supply small,
short loans. First, hire/purchase loans are well-secured because they generate their own collateral.
Second, hire/purchase loans generate high yields and are profitable.2
On the demand side, there are at least three reasons why households accept the stringent
terms and high interest rates of hire/purchase loans. First, there is a strong demand for consumer
durables. Second, many households who cannot qualify for other types of loans nevertheless have
cash flows sufficient to qualify for hire/purchase loans. Third, some households may not realize
that hire/purchase loans carry very high effective interest rates.
In South Africa, the Usury Act (No. 73 of 1968) limits the interest rate on loans greater
than 6,000 Rands. At the end of 1993, this ceiling was about 26 percent per year. As illustrated
above, however, the effective interest rates on hire/purchase loans can easily exceed this limit.
This does not necessarily mean that hire/purchase lenders are usurious. Because most of the per-
loan costs of lending are fixed, the per-Rand costs of small, short loans exceed those of large,
long loans (Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984). Thus, hire/purchase loans reach black,
poor, rural, and female-headed households precisely because their legal structure allows them to
charge cost-covering interest rates without incurring social disapproval nor legal difficulties.
II. Possible Policy Implications of This Investigation
The study asks if, during the waning months of apartheid, a potential customer’s race
affected hire/purchase lending. Each of the two possible outcomes has policy implications.
The first possible outcome is a lack of statistical evidence that race affected hire/purchase
lending. This would imply that hire/purchase lending embodies a technology and a market
structure that reaches relatively poor households regardless of race. The policy implication is that
if lenders can make well-secured loans and can circumvent legal and social impediments to
charging interest rates high enough to cover the costs of supplying small, short loans, then the
natural forces of competition and the market may circumvent artificial political institutions such as3
apartheid. If there is competition and non-discrimination, then profits do not imply exploitation.
Relaxing or repealing the Usury Act would make supplying small, short loans more
socially acceptable and more profitable. This could increase the availability of credit cards or bank
loans for purchases of consumer durables, further increasing competition, lowering interest rates,
and increasing the number of households with access to loans for consumer durables.
The second possible outcome is the presence of statistical evidence that race affected
hire/purchase lending. The policy implication depends on the way race affected hire/purchase
lending. On the one hand, there may have been statistical discrimination: lenders were not bigots,
but race may be correlated with economic characteristics which are unobserved by the lender but
which are correlated with creditworthiness. In this case, the solution is to develop information
technology so that it is more profitable to observe all characteristics correlated with the
creditworthiness directly rather than to use race as a proxy for unobserved characteristics.
On the other hand, lenders may have been bigots and, because competition and the profit
motive were weaker than prejudice, market forces were not the remedy. In this case, the solution
is more difficult. If economic incentives were sufficient, then there would not have been no
discrimination in the first place.
There are at least two ways to combat prejudice, given that hearts and habits are not
completely subject to laws nor to economic incentives. The first way is by relaxing or repealing
the Usury Act, making lending for consumer durables more attractive to the competitors of
hire/purchase lenders. Eventually, competition should drive bigots out of business (Becker).
The second way is by removing all traces of the race of an applicant from the written
credit application. Although race is not explicitly recorded on written applications for4
 Of course, the name and address of the potential borrower must be recorded by the
2
lender, but the evaluator does not need this information.
 Other households encompasses coloured, Indian, and white households.
3
hire/purchase loans, applications do include the applicant’s address,  the applicant’s name, and, in
many cases, the names of parents and relatives. Given the linguistic, cultural, and ethnic history of
South Africa as well as the geographic implications of apartheid, a person’s race is often easily
guessed from an address or a surname. Although written applications are usually evaluated by
someone who has not met the applicant, the loan application provides enough information to
guess the applicant’s race.  Removing obvious clues to a borrower’s race from written
2
applications would make being bigoted more difficult.
There is evidence that hire/purchase lenders discriminated against black households.
Controlling for economic factors that affect creditworthiness (and thus supply) and for factors
that affect desire for consumer durables (and thus demand), black households are 13 percentage
points more likely to desire a hire/purchase loan but not to have one than are other households.
3
Some black households without hire/purchase loans are just as creditworthy as some other
households with hire/purchase loans. The RDP could facilitate the extension of the frontier of
formal loans to black households by relaxing or repealing the Usury Act and thereby increasing
the competition faced by the suppliers of hire/purchase loans, and by removing obvious clues to a
potential borrower’s race from written loan applications.
III. Characteristics of Loan Markets Affecting the Detection of Discrimination
A model used to detect discrimination should incorporate at least five fundamental
characteristics of loan markets. First, observed debt depends on both demand by borrowers and5
on supply from lenders. To observe a hire/purchase loan, the household must desire a consumer
durable and be willing to borrow, and the lender must be willing to supply the loan. If a
disproportionately high demand leads to a high proportion of black households having
hire/purchase debt even in the face of discrimination, then ignoring demand could incorrectly fail
to find evidence of discrimination.
Second, loans are rationed, even in equilibrium (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). For this paper,
rationing is defined as when the price and contractual terms do not fully adjust to equalize supply
and demand. The main cause of rationing in loan markets is, of course, default; prudent lenders
will not meet the demand of non-creditworthy borrowers. In addition, asymmetric information
may lead to signaling, learning, and enforcement costs so high that the potential transaction never
takes place. It also may be prohibitively costly for suppliers of hire/purchase loans to tailor
interest rates and other contractual terms to the circumstances of individual borrowers.
Third, both borrower and lender have veto power, and either may ration the other. Under
demand rationing, the demander is unwilling to borrow as much as the supplier would like to
lend. Supply rationing is the converse. Both types of rationing are not infrequent with
hire/purchase loans. For example, the households whom the lender is likely to perceive as
creditworthy are exactly those households who are most willing and able to pay cash.
Fourth, rationing by either borrower or lender may take two forms. Under loan rationing,
no loan is transacted although one party would have preferred a transaction. Under amount
rationing, a loan is transacted but the loan is smaller than one party would have liked. In the case
of hire/purchase loans, there is loan rationing because some customers pay cash even though the
retailer would like to lend to them and because some customers are denied credit even though6
 Supply rationing that is random or that is correlated with economic criteria is not
4
discrimination.
they would like to borrow. There is also amount rationing, but this study ignores this.
Fifth, not all creditworthy households wish to hold debt at all times. Consumer durables
are purchased infrequently. Therefore, even creditworthy households who are willing to borrow
to finance consumer durables will not hold hire/purchase debt at all times.
An econometric model designed to detect discrimination must distinguish between
rationing and discrimination, between demand rationing and supply rationing, between loan
rationing and amount rationing, and between the absence of debt and the inability to acquire debt.
Discrimination is defined as providing smaller loans and/or providing loans with more
stringent terms to borrowers who are identical with respect to creditworthiness but who differ
with respect to characteristics unrelated to creditworthiness, such as race. Discrimination is
related to rationing in that discrimination is supply rationing correlated with race.
4
This paper is concerned with discrimination in the form of supply-loan rationing correlated
with race. That is, lenders may refuse to supply a loan to black households who are otherwise
equivalent to other households who are supplied with a loan.
IV. Hypothesis and Data
The null hypothesis is that hire/purchase lenders did not discriminate against black
households. The data set is derived from a comprehensive survey of a nationwide random sample
of 8,848 households during August-December of 1993, the last months of apartheid (May et. al.,
1995; Project For Statistics On Living Standards and Development, 1994). The survey collected
all the variables observed by hire/purchase lenders.7
 The means of the independent variables classified by black households, other households,
5
all households, and monthly expenditure quintile is available from the authors.
The dependent variable was taken as the presence or absence of hire/purchase debt.
Independent variables may affect only demand, only supply, or both demand and supply. Table I
classifies the regessors by inclusion in supply, in demand, or in both.
5
On the demand side, some variables influence demand because they influence repayment
ability without influencing supply because they are not observed by the lender. In particular, the
lender cannot observe the amount of monthly payments to informal creditors, the existence of
other formal debts, or the employment status of non-applying household members.
Several demographic variables influence demand but not supply because they proxy for the
life-cycle stage of the household and thus for the demand for consumer durables. These variables
do not influence supply because the lender does not care why a consumer durable is purchased,
but rather cares only about the existence of ability and willingness to repay a hire/purchase loan.
In particular, the age of the head of the household, the size of the household, and the recent
migratory status of the household are likely to influence demand because younger, larger, and
newer households are likely to have higher demands for consumer durables.
Some economic characteristics influence supply but not demand because they affect the
ability to signal repayment capacity without necessarily affecting actual repayment capacity. In
particular, applications for hire/purchase loans gather information on the employment status of the
borrower and enough information to enable checking for past defaults with a credit bureau. Thus
the employment of the household head and home ownership may proxy for having a formal credit
history without necessarily affecting actual creditworthiness.8
Monthly expenditure influences both supply and demand because it proxies for cash flow
and thus repayment capacity. Some demographic variables are also likely to influence both supply
and demand. The location of a household affects transactions costs for both the borrower and the
lender. The sex of the household head may influence demand because female-headed households
are usually single-parent or older households. Sex may affect supply via discrimination, although
that issue is not addressed here. Finally, race may affect supply through discrimination, and it may
affect demand through cultural habits or other effects of the legacy of apartheid.
V. Specifying a Model to Test For Discrimination
It is appropriate to test for discrimination via supply-loan rationing correlated with race
with a partial-observability model because the observed absence of debt at the time of a survey
could be explained by any of the following unobserved events:
￿ No rationing. Neither borrower nor lender desires a transaction, or the borrower is
uncreditworthy;
￿ Demand-loan rationing. Households are unwilling to borrow, but retailers are willing to
lend;
￿ Supply-loan rationing. Retailers are unwilling to lend, but households are willing to
borrow;
￿ Purchase infrequency. The household is willing to borrow and the retailer is willing to
lend, but it happens that the household did not borrow on hire/purchase recently enough
that it had not completed payments by the time of the survey..
Of course, if it is observed that a household does have a monthly payment for
hire/purchase debt, then it is known that the household was willing to borrow, the retailer was
willing to lend, and the household financed the purchase of consumer durable with a hire/purchase
agreement recently enough that it had not completed payments at the time of the survey.
Let DL  be a household’s unobserved demand for a hire/purchase loan, where the
*
household demands a loan if  DL  is unity. Define SL  analogously for supply. QL, the observed
**DL ￿￿ 1i f￿
￿
DLXD￿￿DL>0,
0o t h e r w i s e
,
SL ￿￿ 1i f￿
￿
SLXS￿￿SL>0,
0o t h e r w i s e
,
￿ DL, ￿SL￿Normal(0,1),















 This model can be seen as a disequilibrium model with limited dependent variables.
6
Abowd and Farber (1982) assume uncorrelated error terms, while Poirier (1980) allows for
correlation. The results here do not differ significantly between the two assumptions.
existence of a hire/purchase loan, is unity if both DL  and SL  are unity.
**
Let X, i=D, S, be vectors of independent variables influencing supply or demand. i
Identification requires that X  g X . Finally, assume that supply and demand have random DS
elements ￿, I=DL , SL , that are independent and normally distributed.  Formally, i
** 6
The probability of observing a monthly payment for hire/purchase debt is the product of
the probability that the borrower demanded a loan recently enough not to have completed
payments at the time of the survey and the probability that the lender was willing to supply a loan.
The probability of supply-loan rationing is the probability that the household demanded a
loan and that the lender was unwilling to supply one, that is, Prob(DL =1)Prob(SL =0).
**
Discrimination is estimated as the influence of race on the supply-loan rationing. This is simply the
difference between the probability of supply-loan rationing for a black household and the
probability of supply-loan rationing for an other household, all else equal:10
 The asymptotic standard errors of the changes in the probabilities were calculated by the
7
delta method. The distribution of the ratio of the average estimated effect to its average standard
error is unknown, and so statements about significance are not rigorous.
To our knowledge, this specification is unique in that, using cross-section survey data, it
considers both supply and demand, the disequilibrium nature of loan markets, and the existence of
rationing. The models of racial discrimination in lending of Munnell et. al., Leece, Duca, Avery,
and Maddala and Trost use different data or omit at least one of these considerations.
Discrimination is statistically significant if race has a statistically significant effect on the
estimated probability of supply-loan rationing. Discrimination is economically significant if race
has a meaningfully large estimated effect on supply-loan rationing.
VI. Results and Conclusions
The estimation results of the partial-observability model appear in Table I. Most
coefficients, in particular those on race, expenditure, and employment, are highly statistically
significant, and all statistically significant coefficients have the expected sign.
Table I also contains the estimated effects of each regressor on the probability of supply-
loan rationing. The average effect of race over all observations is 13 percentage points. The size
of this effect suggests that discrimination is economically significant. The average standard error
is 7 percentage points, suggesting that discrimination is also statistically significant.
7
Results available from the authors indicate that the probability of supply-loan rationing is
75 percent for black households and 14 percent for other households. Of the 75 percentage points
for black households, race accounts for 13 and economic factors account for 61.11
All else equal, black households are 13 percentage points more likely to demand a
hire/purchase loan but not to have one supplied to them than are other households.  Although the
model cannot rule out the possibility that at least some of this result is due not to bigotry but
rather to some correlation of race with characteristics correlated with creditworthiness but
unobserved by lenders, the great size of the effect suggests that retailers in South Africa during
apartheid did discriminate against blacks when supplying hire/purchase loans.
Whatever the motivations behind supply-loan rationing correlated with race, it can be
reduced by enabling other forms of consumer credit to compete more effectively with
hire/purchase loans. The best way to do this is by relaxing or repealing the Usury Act so that
small, short loans are more profitable and more respectable. Small, short loans are costly, but they
are the loans demanded by households beyond the frontier of formal lending in South Africa.
If bigotry accounts for at least some of the supply-loan rationing associated with race,
then formal loans may be extended to more households by removing obvious clues to a potential
borrower’s race from the written loan application for hire/purchase loans. In particular, there is no
reason why a loan evaluator needs to know an applicant’s surname or address, data that may
reveal an applicant’s race.12
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